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Question 
Query: What are the key issues surrounding double taxation agreements (DTAs) and developing 
countries? An overview should include:  
• An overview as to the extent of the international tax treaty regime (i.e. how many, 
between which states); 
• Existing commentary of the international standards (i.e. OECD and UN Tax Treaty 
Models); 
• Critical and supportive voices on the role of DTAs in supporting development outcomes 
(i.e. loss of tax revenue versus tax certainty to attract FDI). 
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1. Overview  
The literature estimates that approximately 3,000 Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) are in 
force, which could be a fraction of the number of potential bilateral tax relationships, as there is 
no centralised, complete and public database.  
• Between 1,000 and 2,000 of these agreements involve at least one developing country.  
• Most of these were concluded within the last 20 years, while DTAs between advanced 
economies mostly date from before 1990.  
• Countries in Eastern and Southern Asia have concluded more DTAs than countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
• Asian countries’ treaties grant the source country greater taxing rights than African 
countries’ treaties.  
• Developing countries’ DTAs contain lower withholding tax rates on passive income than 
in the past, but less stringent permanent establishment provisions. 
The overwhelming majority of bilateral DTAs are based, in large part, on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model) and the UN Model Double Taxation 
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN Model). The key difference 
between the Models is that the UN Model preserves a greater share of taxing rights for the 
source country (i.e. the country where investment takes place). Although the UN Model is more 
advantageous for developing countries than the OECD Model, negotiations to date using the UN 
Model have not been too successful. Furthermore, despite being in a majority, developing 
countries lack influence in the UN’s Committee of Experts, while the OECD’s Committee of Fiscal 
Affairs has considerably more resources and technical capacity than the UN Committee.  
The literature shows that between two economies with largely reciprocal Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) positions, the reallocation of taxing rights towards the residence country after 
signing a DTA is not that problematic. When, however, such a treaty is signed between two 
countries with an asymmetric investment position, the capital-importing country risks forfeiting tax 
revenues. Although not conclusive, literature shows that source countries could benefit from a 
FDI inflow, however, positive effects on FDI is most likely for middle-income countries and less 
likely for low-income countries. Other studies find a significant impact on firms’ entry into a 
particular country, though not on the level of their investment once they are present.  
Whether a capital importing country benefits from signing a DTA depends also on the effects on 
its tax base.  
• Like corporate income tax rates treaty withholding tax rates have trended downward over 
the past decades, suggesting that they have been subject to a similar process of tax 
competition.  
• Treaty shopping by international operating corporations in which they search for tax 
minimisation through the network of tax treaties, is a real concern according to the 
literature.  
• Studies show that treaties with the Netherlands led to foregone revenue for developing 
countries of at least EUR 770 million in 2011. Similar, calculations suggest that US tax 
treaties cost their non-OECD country counterparts perhaps $1.6 billion in 2010.  
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That developing countries are still attractive to negotiate such deals means that source countries’ 
governments have political and economic objectives beyond the immediate attraction of 
investment that may be served by a treaty, such as the desire to heighten tax enforcement 
cooperation with the treaty partner, the need to satisfy the interests of particular domestic 
constituencies who will benefit from the treaty or the aim of strengthening diplomatic ties with 
another country. 
According to the literature, there is significant FDI asymmetry and capacity asymmetry in 
negotiations between high income countries and low-income countries, impacting the outcome of 
DTAs.  
• Research shows that developing countries that depend more on corporate income tax 
are more likely to sign tax treaties with wealthier countries and more likely to negotiate 
higher WITHHOLDING TAX rates in those treaties, but no more likely to obtain better 
results overall.  
• The more complex clauses are less likely to be favourable to developing countries when 
the FDI relationship between the two countries is more one-sided, with the developing 
country more of a net importer of capital from the treaty partner.  
• Developing countries also become better negotiators as they gain experience.  
The literature mentions several ways to improve the position of source (developing) countries. 
One is the inclusion of “limitation of benefit’ provisions that can provide important protection as it 
limits reduced withholding rates and other treaty provisions to apply only to companies that meet 
specific tests of having some genuine presence in the treaty country. Another way is to increase 
knowledge and awareness on spill-over effects of tax treaties on developing countries. The IMF 
states that “considerable caution” is needed when entering any DTA where one party is primarily 
a capital-importing country. 
2. The international DTA network 
Analysing the extent of the international Double Taxation Agreements (DTA) network is difficult 
due to the absence of a centralised, complete, public database (Hearson, 2016a, p.13). Hearson 
(2016a, p.7) notes that information on DTAs is “scattered in PDF files on websites or in 
proprietary databases”, which makes measuring and comparing countries’ treaty networks 
challenging. Nevertheless, both he and the IMF (2014, p.25) estimate that approximately 3,000 
DTAs are in force. While this is a large number, it is only a fraction of the number of potential 
bilateral relationships (IMF, 2014, p.25). Depending on how “developing country” is defined, 
between 1,000 and 2,000 of these agreements involve at least one developing country (Hearson, 
2016a, p.10). Most of these were concluded within the last 20 years, while DTAs between 
advanced economies mostly date from before 1990 (IMF, 2014, p.25).  
To address the gap in comparative DTA data, Hearson developed the publicly available 
ActionAid Treaties Dataset (Hearson, 2016a, p.7). The dataset presents information on DTAs for 
low- and lower-middle-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern and Southern Asia, 
excluding India and Indonesia.1 All DTAs concluded by these countries since 1970 are included, 
                                                   
1 India and Indonesia are excluded due to their roles a capital exporters to the other sample countries (Hearson, 2016a: 13) 
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except those which depart significantly from the conventional content of modern treaties and/or 
are unavailable in English. The resulting sample includes 519 DTAs, approximately one sixth of 
the total number in force. The following bullets provide descriptive statistics on this portion of the 
international DTA network: 
• Countries in Eastern and Southern Asia have concluded more DTAs than countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are 314 tax treaties in force in Asia, compared to 205 in 
Africa (Hearson 2016b). Six Asian countries (Pakistan, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Philippines, 
Bangladesh and Mongolia) have concluded 30 or more DTAs, while no African country 
has concluded more than 19 (Figure 1). However, there are stark differences between 
Asian countries, with nearly half of those sampled having fewer than ten agreements in 
force. 
• Over half of the agreements are with non-OECD countries. 51% of the treaties in 
Africa and 55% of the treaties in Asia are with non-OECD countries (Hearson, 2016b). 
Most of these were signed after 2000; before the millennium, the majority of developing 
countries’ DTAs were with advanced economies (Hearson, 2016b; Hearson 2015, p.8). 
Among African countries, the largest number of treaties are with South Africa, Mauritius, 
United Kingdom, Italy and Norway (Figure 2). India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand have signed the most treaties in Asia (Figure 3). 
• Asian countries’ treaties grant the source country greater taxing rights than 
African countries’ treaties. The dataset scores each DTA against a “Source” index, 
which measures the number of pro-source provisions it contains (Hearson 2016a, p.17). 
Pro-source provisions entitle a country to tax foreign income earned within its borders. 
Asian countries’ DTAs score consistently higher against index than African countries’ 
DTAs on average, indicating that Asian countries retain greater taxing rights on inward 
foreign investment than African countries (Hearson, 2016a, p.19-20). Moreover, the gap 
has widened over time (Hearson, 2016a, p.20). This trend is partly explained by the fact 
that Asian countries have concluded a greater proportion of their agreements with non-
OECD countries (see previous bullet). The dataset finds that non-OECD countries 
impose fewer restrictions on developing countries’ source taxing rights than OECD 
countries when concluding DTAs (Hearson, 2016a, p.20). In fact, OECD countries’ DTAs 
with developing countries are increasingly curbing the latter’s ability to tax foreign 
income, indicating “a growing division between approaches to tax treaty negotiation in the 
OECD and the rest of the world” (Hearson, 2016a, p.36). 
• Developing countries’ DTAs contain lower withholding tax rates than in the past, 
but less stringent permanent establishment provisions. There are two key ways that 
DTAs can restrict a country’s ability to tax foreign investors. First, by lowering the rate of 
withholding tax levied on foreign income earned at source. Second, by imposing a high 
threshold for permanent establishment, that is, the minimum level of activity that must 
take place before taxes can be levied (Hearson, 2016a, p.9). The dataset constructs a 
‘WHT’ index and a ‘PE’ index in order to measure the restrictiveness of DTAs’ 
withholding tax and permanent establishment provisions across countries and over time 
(Hearson, 2016a, p.17). For both African and Asian countries, there is a trend towards 
lower withholding tax rates. In Africa, this trend is more pronounced in DTAs with OECD 
countries (Hearson, 2016a, p.22). However, PE provisions are becoming less restrictive 
over time, which means that recent DTAs expand the circumstances in which countries 
can tax foreign companies’ income within their borders (Hearson, 2016a, p.22). 
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Figure 1: Number of DTAs concluded by Asian and African countries since 1970 
  
Source: Hearson, 2016b; analysed by the author 
Figure 2: Countries having signed five or more treaties with African countries 
 
Source: Hearson, 2016b; analysed by the author 
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Figure 3: Countries having signed five or more treaties with Asian countries 
 
Source: Hearson, 2016b; analysed by the author 
3. International DTA models 
The OECD & UN Models 
The overwhelming majority of bilateral DTAs are based, in large part, on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model) and the UN Model Double Taxation 
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN Model) (Arnold, 2015, p.1). The 
OECD Model was first published in 1963 and has since been revised multiple times, most 
recently in 2017 (EY, 2017). The UN Model was published in 1980 and was revised in 2001 and 
in 2011 (Arnold, 2015, p.5). Both Models are accompanied by a detailed Commentary to facilitate 
interpretation and application of their provisions (Arnold, 2015, p.4-5). 
The UN Model follows the pattern set by the OECD Model and many of its provisions are 
identical, or nearly so. Therefore, “it makes sense not to view the United Nations Model 
Convention as entirely separate [from the OECD Model] but rather as making important, but 
limited, modifications” (Arnold, 2015, p.5). The key difference between the Models is that the UN 
Model was produced “with regard to the special needs of developing countries” and therefore 
preserves a greater share of taxing rights for the source country (i.e. the country where 
investment takes place) (Hearson, 2016, p.31; UN, 2012, p.1). Relative to the OECD Model, it 
permits taxation of more types of cross-border income and lowers the threshold for permanent 
establishment. For example, unlike Article 12 (Royalties) of the OECD Model, Article 12 of the 
UN Model does not prevent the source country from imposing tax on royalties paid by a resident 
of the source country to a resident of the other country (Arnold, 2015, p.5). The UN Model also 
considers a construction site to have permanent establishment after 6 months, compared to 12 
months under the OECD Model (Arnold, 2015, p.5). 
0
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Another important difference between the Models is the process by which they are revised. 
Decisions about the OECD Model and its Commentary are taken by a sub-committee of the 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs called Working Party 1 (Hearson, 2015, p.32). This consists 
of senior tax officials from OECD member countries (Arnold, 2015, p.4). Non-member developing 
countries are able to enter formal “observations” on the OECD Model and its Commentary, but 
have no other means of influence (Hearson, 2015, p.32). The UN Model and its Commentaries 
are revised and maintained by the UN’s Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in 
Tax Matters (Arnold, 2015, p.5). In contrast to the Working Party 1, a small majority of the tax 
officials in the Committee of Experts are from developing and emerging economies (Arnold, 
2015, p.5).  
On paper, the UN Model is more advantageous for developing countries than the OECD Model. 
As net capital-importers, developing countries stand to benefit from the UN Model’s pro-source 
provisions, which allow increased taxation of inward foreign investment (Hearson, 2016a, p.8). 
They also have greater opportunity to influence revisions to the UN Model, as they are well-
represented on the relevant decision-making body. However, in practice, there are a number of 
caveats to this assessment, as identified by Hearson (2015, p.32). 
• Negotiations to date using the UN Model have not been too successful. Although 
developing country negotiators frequently refer to the UN Model as their starting point in 
negotiations, the actual treaties signed by developing countries contain on average many 
more OECD provisions than UN provisions. This may be because developing countries’ 
tax laws are weaker than the UN Model or because their negotiating capacity is low. 
• Despite being in a majority, developing countries lack influence in the UN’s 
Committee of Experts. There are many issues over which Committee members from 
developed and developing countries disagree, a notable example being a proposed 
revision to allow source countries to tax technical service fees. However, developed 
country members, particularly from the European Union, exhibit a better coordinated 
approach to influencing the UN instruments than developing country members. 
Moreover, attendance among developing country members at Committee sessions is 
often low. 
• The OECD’s Committee of Fiscal Affairs has considerably more resources and 
technical capacity than the UN Committee. As a result, the OECD Model is updated 
more frequently than the UN Model, often with revisions that benefit both developed and 
developing countries. For example, the 2017 update of the OECD Model mainly 
comprised changes recommended by the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project in 
order to reduce opportunities for tax planning (EY, 2017). Thus, there is a view that the 
UN Model is out of date (Hearson, 2015, p.32). 
Other Models 
In addition to the OECD and the UN Models, some regional economic organisations have also 
formulated model DTAs. Two examples are examined below. 
The East Africa Community (EAC) Model 
The EAC has formulated a model DTA for negotiations by its members with third parties. This 
has some strengths relative to the UN Model. For example, it includes a general “limitation of 
benefits” clause, which prevents application of the treaty where the company concerned has 
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been using it for treaty shopping. It also permits a withholding tax to be levied on management 
fees, unlike both the UN and OECD Models. However, Hearson (2015, p.28-9) identifies a 
number of shortcomings in the EAC’s model. First, it specifies low withholding tax rates on FDI 
shares, interest and royalty payments and management fees. Second, it draws tighter restrictions 
on the circumstances in which African countries can tax inward investment as “permanent 
establishment” than the UN Model. Third, the EAC model omits the UN paragraph allowing 
source country taxation on capital gains from the sale of general shares. Hearson (2015, p.30) 
argues that some of these provisions “could have been kept in reserve, rather than included in 
the model, to be given up in return for something else during negotiations”. 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Model 
The COMESA model DTA was developed by European consultants in 2010-12 (Hearson, 2015, 
p.30). Its main advantages are the inclusion of specific anti-avoidance provisions and its revision 
process whereby member states can enter “reservations” on the existing model. However, the 
COMESA model’s protection of source taxing rights is weaker than both the EAC and UN 
models. For example, its permanent establishment clauses are particularly restrictive and it 
employs a less-expansive definition of royalties. It also fails to specify withholding tax rates, 
which may be preferable to the low rates set out in the EAC model, but is less beneficial than 
higher rates would be. 
4. The impact of DTAs 
Both the OECD and (to a lesser extent) the UN Models favour the residence principle; where tax 
residents of a country are subject to taxation on their worldwide income, a greater portion of 
taxation rights are allocated to a residence country (Dauer & Krever, 2012). DTAs thereby shift 
taxing rights from the source state (capital-importing country) to the residence state (capital–
exporting country). Research shows that between two economies with largely reciprocal Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) positions, this reallocation of taxing rights is not problematic. When, 
however, such a treaty is signed between two countries with an asymmetric investment position, 
the capital-importing country risks forfeiting tax revenues (Braun & Fuentes, 2016, p.384). This is 
the case for developing countries, who have to balance the costs (e.g. revenue losses) with the 
benefits (e.g. increase of FDI) of a DTA.  
Impact on FDI 
The primary benefit that developing countries seek from signing a DTA is increased inward 
investment. Yet the evidence for such an effect is inconclusive. One of the problems that the 
literature highlights is that identifying causality is inherently problematic, since tax treaties may 
precede investment not because they spur the latter, but because they may be concluded only 
when there is an expectation of such investment (IMF, 2014, p.26). Hence, studies that measure 
the impact of DTAs on FDI flows to countries are “susceptible” to the concern that what they are 
measuring is actually tax treaties’ responding to, rather than causing, changing patterns of 
inward investment (Hearson, 2018, p.236).  
The literature distinguishes the following assumptions regarding FDI flows: 
• Signing a tax treaty relieves international investors from double taxation, the reduction of 
withholding tax rates on passive income provides incentives for FDI, and by signing 
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DTAs governments show to investors the willingness to adopt internationally accepted 
tax standards (e.g. Blonigen et al, 2014; Lang & Owens, 2013). 
• Comprehensive domestic legislation that provides an overall transparent, non-
discriminatory and predictable tax environment is more important for foreign investors 
than a DTA alone. This means that a clear relationship between domestic law and DTAs 
is important for an easier application of DTA provisions (e.g. Pickering, 2013). 
• Although controversial, some literature also assumes that DTAs could hamper FDI flows 
through their prevention of tax avoidance (e.g. through profit shifting), tax evasion, and 
treaty shopping, for example through information exchange clauses in DTAs (e.g. Barthel 
et al., 2010; Blonigen et al., 2014).  
Several empirical studies in economic literature have investigated how far DTAs have an impact 
on FDI, however, with very mixed results. Although inconclusive, more recent literature seems to 
show that there is to some extent a positive impact of DTAs on FDI flows (Hearson, 2018, p.236). 
Some of the most important findings on the impact of DTAs on FDI are: 
• Studies using macro-level data find a wide range of effects, however, positive 
effects on FDI is most likely for middle-income countries and less likely for low-
income countries. Millimet and Kumas (2007) find a positive impact of treaties for 
countries with low initial FDI levels (but a negative impact for countries with high initial 
levels), and Neumayer (2007) finds a positive impact on US outbound FDI only for 
middle-income countries. Barthel and others (2010), analysing a dataset of 105 
countries, find a positive impact of treaties on FDI stocks, particularly for middle-income 
countries. For a broad dataset of 155 countries, Di Giovanni (2005) finds a positive 
impact on mergers and acquisitions.  
• Studies using firm-level data find a significant impact on firms’ entry into a 
particular country, though not on the level of their investment once they are 
present. Davies and others (2009), using firm-level data on Swedish corporations, find 
that treaties raise the probability of entry into a country by 17 percent relative to the 
sample average, but, conditional on presence, have little impact on investment. Egger 
and Merlo (2011) find similar results from firm-level data from Germany: controlling for 
the host country tax rate, the presence of treaty increases the probability of entry by 58 
percent relative to the sample mean. 
• There is evidence that “tax sparing” provisions (through credits and exemptions) 
of DTAs have encouraged FDI. Such provisions grant to multinational enterprises that 
benefit from source country (developing countries) tax incentives a credit against 
residence country (developed countries) tax, equal to the source country tax saved as a 
result of those incentives (Hearson, 2018).  
• Studies of the impact of withholding tax rates on FDI find mixed results. Egger et al 
(2006) find that the outbound FDI of OECD countries is negatively related to source 
country dividend withholding taxes, controlling separately for corporate income tax rates 
and depreciation allowances. Arena and Roper (2010), examining marginal debt 
issuance decisions for internationally operating companies based in 29 countries, find 
that a low ratio of interest to dividend withholding tax results in a higher leverage ratio for 
foreign subsidiaries.  
• Studies that aim to capture the impact of DTAs solely through a dummy variable 
also find mixed results. A reason could be that most DTAs contain both elements that 
may encourage FDI (such as reduced withholding tax rates and clarity of liability) and 
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elements that could discourage it (such as commitment to information exchange). The 
outcome is that they may balance each other out. A study by Blonigen et al (2011) 
analysing US firm-level data found that the presence of a tax treaty increases average 
foreign affiliate sales by 45%, while the exchange of information reduces them by 28%. 
The authors also find that presence of a DTA roughly doubles the entry rate of new 
foreign affiliates. 
A case study on India (Murthy & Bhasin, 2014) shows the importance of including variables as 
GDP and per capita income in FDI analysis for a better understanding of the demand driven and 
supply driven forces of investment. Overall the study shows that the introduction of tax treaties 
had a positive impact on FDI inflows into India. As this study shows, this was further stimulated 
by growth in India’s GDP and as well as growth of per capita income in residence countries 
(high-income countries). The former ensures the supply of capital abroad and the latter the 
demand in source countries (Murthy & Bhasin, 2014, p.761). This means that a low population 
growth of residence countries and a relatively high GDP growth of source countries are main 
drivers of supply and demand of capital flows. 
A case study (Braun & Fuentes, 2016) on the impact of DTAs that Austria has signed with 
developing countries shows that the number of Austrian investment projects in middle income 
countries increases by 25.2% to 33.7% when a DTA is in place. However, the results may 
capture treaty shopping, which could lead to an overestimation of the effect of DTAs on FDI 
originating in Austria (Braun & Fuentes, 2016, p.412). 
Impact on tax revenue 
Whether a capital importing country benefits from signing a DTA depends not only on how much it 
gains from FDI, but also whether this gain offsets any tax revenue loss. By committing to reduced 
withholding tax rates on inactive income (e.g. dividend, interest, royalties etc.), countries that are 
primarily capital importers reduce their tax revenue at any given level of inward investment. The 
exchange of information aspects of DTAs, however, run in the other direction: they may increase 
source country revenue at unchanged behaviour and, by the same token, could discourage inward 
investment (IMF, 2014, p.26). 
With a treaty in place, international business’ incentive is to extract income in forms that attract a low 
or zero withholding tax rate, which may be ones that the host authorities find particularly difficult to 
value. As the IMF paper (2014) shows, the opportunities for this are amplified by the possibility of 
“treaty shopping”: constructing advantageous routing by linking bilateral tax treaties, typically through 
low tax conduit countries. In effect, a treaty with one country can become a treaty with the rest of the 
world. Some literature make estimations of the loss, for instance, that treaties with the Netherlands 
led to foregone revenue for developing countries of at least EUR 770 million in 2011 (McGauran, 
2013). Similar, calculations suggest that US tax treaties cost their non-OECD country counterparts 
perhaps $1.6 billion in 2010 (IMF, 2014, p.68).  
Like corporate income tax rates (see also the K4D HDR 324 on tax competition)2, both domestic law 
and treaty withholding tax rates have trended downward over the past decades, suggesting that they 
have been subject to a similar process of tax competition (IMF, 2014, p.28). Since the early 1980s, 
                                                   
2 See: Quak, E. (2018) The Impact of International Tax Competition on Low and Middle-Income Countries. K4D Helpdesk 
Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.  https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/13784  
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tax treaty withholding tax rates on portfolio dividends, interest and royalties have on average fallen by 
about 30%, while the average rate on participating dividends has fallen almost 50% (see table).  
Table 1: The evolution of WHT rates 
Time 
period 
Dividend Participating 
dividend 
Interest Royalty  
Year: Average Domestic Law WHT Rates No. countries 
2000 15.2 14.1 15.1 17.2 107 
2013 13.1 10.7 14.0 15.7 179 
Treaty age: Average Treaty WHT Rates No. treaties 
0-5 10.1 5.6 7.9 8.0 533 
5-10 11.7 6.9 9.1 9.3 635 
10-20 12.4 8.1 9.6 9.8 1554 
20-30 14.2 11.2 10.8 11.5 529 
>30 14.6 11.1 11.7 11.3 328 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation database, 2011 (from: IMF, 2014, p.69). 
In practice, rather than relieving double taxation, the most significant effect of a DTA between a 
developed and a developing country is to shift the burden of tax alleviation from the former to the 
latter (Brooks & Krever, 2015; Paolini et al., 2016). As Hearson (2018, p.236) explains, this is 
because “most developed countries already take unilateral steps to relieve double taxation on their 
investors, either by giving them a credit for taxes paid abroad or increasingly by exempting foreign-
source income from domestic tax altogether”. A developed country that uses the credit system may 
raise more tax revenue as a result of the treaty, because the tax liability in the developing country 
falls. If developed countries instead exempt their outward investors from tax on the profits they make 
in developing countries (whether through treaties or their tax laws), this may compromise developing 
countries’ ability to tax those investors. This is because, if investors face no further tax on their 
earnings beyond that incurred in the host state, they have a greater incentive to encourage tax 
competition between potential host states or to try to avoid paying tax in them (Hearson, 2018, p.236). 
The findings from the literature shows that tax treaties, although initiated to avoid double taxation, 
could be used as an instrument for tax competition. Although the literature mentions tax treaty 
shopping as a mechanism that undermines a transparent international tax system this phenomenon is 
not part of the impact analysis of tax treaties. There is few literature available that takes into account 
treaty shopping as part of its analysis. Just one study (Hong, 2017) could be found;it looks into the 
direct and indirect routes that multinationals take to minimise taxation by using DTAs. It shows that 
tax treaty shopping has a substantial effect on tax reductions on dividends incurred by multinational 
investors and as such face significant tax revenue losses (Hong, 2017, p.).  
The IMF (2014) even discourages developing countries from signing treaties and advices their 
governments to renegotiate current tax treaties. Some countries like Mongolia, Argentina, Rwanda, 
Uganda and Zambia have done this. Why most developing countries are still attractive to negotiate 
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such deals could be explained that source countries’ governments may also have political and 
economic objectives beyond the immediate attraction of investment that may be served by a treaty, 
such as the desire to heighten tax enforcement cooperation with the treaty partner, the need to satisfy 
the interests of particular domestic constituencies who will benefit from the treaty or the aim of 
strengthening diplomatic ties with another country (Christians, 2005; Pickering, 2013).  
5. The role of power asymmetry 
The literature also shows that for developing countries the outcome of signing DTAs depends 
heavily on their negotiation skills to overcome power asymmetry. According to the literature, there 
is significant FDI asymmetry and capacity asymmetry in negotiations between high income countries 
and low-income countries (Hearson, 2018, p.239). Qualitative case studies of these negotiation 
outcomes emphasise power politics, knowledge asymmetries and negotiating capability in the 
eventual distribution of taxing rights between signatories, yet such insights are absent from cross-
country quantitative work. Until now quantitative studies of tax treaty negotiation have generally 
assumed that negotiation decisions by developing countries reflect a rational assessment of the costs 
and benefits (Hearson, 2018, p.234). However, developing countries’ approach to negotiating tax 
treaties under constraints of asymmetries has been “boundedly” rational at best (Hearson & Kangave, 
2016). In a bounded rationality framework, negotiators and policy makers with limited capacity to 
assimilate information will resort to heuristics, for example, by according a greater weight to 
information that is ‘more available’ because it is easier to understand or obtain (Poulsen, 2014). 
The study of Hearson (2018) is the only one that takes into account the power asymmetries for the 
outcome of tax treaties on the economy. The study shows that: 
• Developing countries that depend more on corporate income tax are more likely to 
sign tax treaties with wealthier countries and more likely to negotiate higher 
withholding tax rates in those treaties, but no more likely to obtain better results 
overall. Because withholding tax rates are the most prominent parts of tax treaties to non-
specialists, this supports a “salience” argument derived from the bounded rationality literature: 
policy makers in countries that depend more on corporate tax are willing to support a policy of 
signing tax treaties, so long as higher withholding tax rates are negotiated, while ignoring 
other, less easily understood parts of the treaty. In contrast, developing countries that raise 
more tax revenue overall are more likely to negotiate better Permanent Establishment 
clauses, an area that is less easily understood by non-specialists, as well as a better overall 
balance across all provisions of the treaty. Greater tax revenue overall is thus associated with 
better negotiation, but it does not make a country more or less likely to sign tax treaties.  
• The more complex clauses are less likely to be favourable to developing countries 
when the FDI relationship between the two countries is more one-sided, with the 
developing country more of a net importer of capital from the treaty partner. This could 
be because the higher tax/GDP and smaller FDI asymmetry translates into greater bargaining 
strength in negotiations. This findings could also indicate that power asymmetries play a role 
in negotiations between developed and developing countries, but not in negotiations between 
more developed countries. 
• Developing countries also become better negotiators as they gain experience. This 
makes a strong case for developing countries to revisit their existing treaty networks as their 
understanding of their fiscal costs grows. 
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6. Alternatives for current DTAs 
The literature mentions several ways to improve the position of source (developing) countries. 
One is the inclusion of “limitation of benefit’ provisions that can provide important protection as it 
limits reduced withholding rates and other treaty provisions to apply only to companies that meet 
specific tests of having some genuine presence in the treaty country (such as a minimum share 
of ownership by its residents or a minimum level of income from conducting an active trade or 
business there). Although the OECD recommends inclusion of limitation of benefit provisions, 
they are not common in treaties (IMF, 2014, p.27). Limitation of benefit provisions are often 
complex and are not self-executing: where capacity is weak and access to information limited, 
verifying that the pre-requisites for treaty benefits are met can be difficult. However, treaties 
sometimes include anti-abuse provisions in the form of more general ‘beneficial ownership’ rules, 
though these normally apply only to withholding provisions and not to entire treaties, and are 
subject to much more interpretation by the source country. 
The European Commission’s Communication on the External Strategy for Fair Taxation (2016) 
states that Member States should apply a balanced approach to negotiating bilateral tax treaties 
with low-income countries. The Commission also announced that it would launch a debate with 
Member States, within the Platform on Tax Good Governance, on how to ensure fair treatment of 
developing countries in bilateral tax treaties. This initiative builds on the momentum created by 
the UN Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development to 
reconsider aspects of international tax treaties. The European Commission takes the issue 
seriously as it wants to ensure consistency between tax and development policies (EC COMM, 
2015). In this context, Member States could take steps to reconsider their tax policies with 
developing countries, in order to reduce spill-overs and ensure consistency with development 
needs. Such possible revisions would be in line with the provisions concerning Policy Coherence 
for Development (TFEU, Article 208) as reiterated by the European Consensus on Development. 
It is part of the "Collect More-Spent Better" strategy that outlines how the EU intends to assist 
developing countries over the coming years in building fair and efficient tax systems, including by 
tackling corporate tax avoidance. As such the Platform on Tax Good Governance has developed 
a tool box for Member States to measure spill-over effects of EU tax policies on developing 
countries (EC, 2017). 
Based on his research, Hearson also set out on his website ‘Tax, Development and International 
Relations” some recommendations for developing countries:3  
• Incorporate an assessment of tax foregone due to tax treaties into an annual breakdown of 
tax expenditures. 
• Ensure that all tax treaties are subject to parliamentary approval as part of the ratification 
process. 
• Ensure that future updates to provisions of the UN and OECD model treaties, or to their 
commentaries and reservations/observations, reflect the positions set out in their national 
models. 
                                                   
3 Retrieved from the website of Martin Hearson: “Tax treaties in sub-Saharan Africa: a critical review” (23 November 2015) 
https://martinhearson.wordpress.com/2015/11/23/tax-treaties-in-sub-saharan-africa-a-critical-review/  
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• Strengthen the African model treaties (EAC, COMESA, SADC) so that they act as opposite 
poles to the OECD model, rather than compromises between the UN and OECD models. 
The IMF goes even further, stating that “considerable caution” is needed when entering any DTA 
where one party is primarily a capital-importing country (IMF, 2014, p.26). Except from the 
exchange of information aspects, the reciprocal benefits of a treaty may be of relatively little 
value. The exchange of information can also be provided by signing a Tax Information Exchange 
Agreement or by signing the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance, while any 
withholding tax rates and the permanent establishment definition can be provided in domestic 
law. If a DTA has been (re)negotiated it should include a limitation for benefit clause also in 
domestic law (IMF, 2014, p.28).  
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